Kunapipi
Volume 13

Issue 3

Article 17

1991

The Debate on Current Theories of Colonial Discourse
Anne Maxwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Maxwell, Anne, The Debate on Current Theories of Colonial Discourse, Kunapipi, 13(3), 1991.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi/vol13/iss3/17

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The Debate on Current Theories of Colonial Discourse
Abstract
In a recent article entitled 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse', 1 Benita Parry is critical of
the recent trend in contemporary anticolonialist criticism to 'disown work done within radical traditions
other than the most recently enunciated heterodoxies' .2 In her opinion the contemporary taste for 'theory'
has led to the down-grading of the antiimperialist discourses of colonial liberation movements begun in
the 1950s, and in particular the 'exemplary and exceptional radical stance' of Fanon. And she warns that
this development may result in a criticism which is unable to withstand the force of the dominant order. In
taking up such a position, Parry claims to be siding with critics such as Edward Said and Abdul Jan
Mohamed, for whom resistance requires not a return to a transparent realism, but an oppositional stance
(she is particularly impressed by Jan Mohamed's theory of Manichean aesthetics)? and to be distancing
herself from critics like Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, who confine themselves to the purely negative
task of deconstructing the texts of colonialism.
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------------------------------------------ Anne Maxwell

ANNE MAXWELL

The Debate on Current Theories of
Colonial Discourse
In a recent article entitled 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse',1 Benita Parry is critical of the recent trend in contemporary anticolonialist criticism to 'disown work done within radical traditions other
than the most recently enunciated heterodoxies' .2 In her opinion the
contemporary taste for 'theory' has led to the down-grading of the antiimperialist discourses of colonial liberation movements begun in the 1950s,
and in particular the 'exemplary and exceptional radical stance' of Fanon.
And she warns that this development may result in a criticism which is
unable to withstand the force of the dominant order. In taking up such a
position, Parry claims to be siding with critics such as Edward Said and
Abdul Jan Mohamed, for whom resistance requires not a return to a transparent realism, but an oppositional stance (she is particularly impressed
by Jan Mohamed's theory of Manichean aesthetics)? and to be distancing
herself from critics like Horni Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, who confine
themselves to the purely negative task of deconstructing the texts of colonialism.
Spivak is the main target of Parry's disapproval. In particular, Parry is
critical of Spivak's obliteration of the role of the native 'as historical
subject and combatant, possessor of another knowledge and producer of
alternative traditions';4 for in Parry's view it is the appeal to the equal
aspects of native tradition which furnishes the colonized with an alternative representational framework or form of language from which to fashion
a combatant subjectivity or self. Such a figure, she argues, is represented
by the character of Christophine, the recalcitrant black native woman in
Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea.5 According to Parry, Spivak 'misconstrues'
Christophine, seeing her as only a tangential figure whose image is conflated with that of the similarly marginalized character of Antoinette, the
white Creole woman who is also 'native' to the colonies. Interpreted thus,
Christophine is effectively silenced by the epistemic violence of imperialism, her presence merely serving to mark the limits of the European text.
By way of contrast to this explication of Christophine as an unknown, because silenced entity, Parry gives her the status of both speaking subject
and interpreter who acts to disrupt it.6 In this respect, she judges Spivak's
approach to be even less radically subversive than Bhabha's; for he at least
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offers the colonized some hope of being able to challenge colonial authority through the mimicry of colonial discourse. This is 'a mode of contradictm;y utterance that ambivalently re-inscribes both colonizer and colonized'. Despite this distinction, however, Parry remains generally critical
of Bhabha's stance. After all, as Bhabha himself concedes, 'The place of
differences and otherness, or the space of the adversarial, within such a
system of "disposal" as I've proposed, is never entirely on the outside or
implacably oppositional' .8
This brings me to Parry's second complaint against Bhabha's and
Spivak's methods- their refusal of a Manichean discourse based on binary
oppositions. Hence her observation that their narratives of colonialism
serve to 'obscure the "murderous and decisive struggle between two protagonists", and discount or write out the counter-discourses which every
liberation movement records' .9 What is being targeted here is the purely
'deconstructive' nature of their critical approach - its decision to do no
more than 'place incendiary devices within the dominant structures of representation and not to confront these with another knowledge' .10 This is
a failure which is reflected in a further weakness of their work, namely its
'exorbitation of discourse and a related incuriosity about the enabling
socicreconomic and political institutions and other forms of social praxis' .11
In short, the charge is that their use of deconstruction is a narrowly
'textualist' one which does not allow for any point outside of discourse
from which concrete forms of opposition can be marshalled. Not surprisingly, Parry is also highly critical of both Bhabaha's and Spivak's dissolving of the binary opposition colonizer I colonized in favour of a much
less differentiated concept.12 The power of this opposition, she argues, lies
precisely in its ability to recover humanism's idea of the unified self. As
against this, deconstruction has little more to offer than 'a silent place laid
waste by imperialism's epistemic violence, or an agonistic space within
which unequally placed contestants negotiate an imbalance of power'. 13
To summarize, what Parry is attacking is the critic's refusal to attribute
to the colonized a unified consciousness or speaking voice which will enable him or her to stand in unmitigated antagonism to the oppressor. This
is the result of an inordinate preoccupation with 'theory , and in particular
deconstruction's critique of the sovereign subject. Instead, Parry believes
that critics should be concentrating on articulating the margins, and gaining control of the way in which the marginalized are represented. This is
to take seriously Said's claim that feminism, black, ethnic and antiimperialist studies all rest similarly upon one ethiccrdiscursive principle,
'the right of formerly un- or misrepresented human groups to speak for
and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually,
as normally excluding them, usurping their signifying and representing
functions, over-riding their historical reality' .14
Parry's position is admirable in its intent, but is surely not without its
own problems, the most serious of which are her quarrel with deconstruc-
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tion or 'theory', and her perception of the colonized as being the holder
of an authentic, sovereign voice. But let us start with her quarrel with
deconstruction or 'theory'. The idea that deconstruction reflects a failure
to connect textual subversions to concrete forms of struggle in the world
appears to be an example of what Homi Bhabha has condemned as 'the
damaging and self-defeating assumption ... that theory is necessarily the
elite language of the socially and culturally privileged'. 15 For according to
him, it is part of this heterodoxy that '[t]he Olympian realms of what is
mistakenly labelled "pure theory'' are assumed to be eternally insulated
from the historical exigencies and tragedies of the wretched of the earth' .16
Bhabha's defence of theory rests on its ability to reveal or analyse the processes involved in the ideological production of representational images.
He argues that the categorical distinction between practice and theory, or
politics and text, overlooks the metaphorical and rhetorical force of writing
as 'a productive matrix which defines the "social" and makes it available
as an objective of/for action'. Hence, '[t]extuality is not simply a secondorder ideological expression or a verbal symptom of a pre-given political
subject' ;17 it too can be a force for social change. Indeed, for Bhabha,
theory has more to offer in the way of hope for the oppressed than the
sort of criticism which attempts to resurrect the rigid binary oppositions
which inform 'identity', for what must never be forgotten is that the latter
carries with it its own legacy of violence:
Must we always polarize in order to polemicize? Are we trapped in a politics of
struggle where the representation of social antagonisms and historical contradictions
can take no other form than a binarism of theory vs. politics? Can the aim of freedom or knowledge be the simple inversion of the relation of oppressor and oppressed, margin and periphery, negative image and positive image? Is our only way
out of such dualism the espousal of an implacable oppositionality or the invention
of an originary counter-myth of radical purity? Must the project of our liberationist
aesthetics be for ever part of a totalizing, Utopian vision of Being and History that
seeks to transcend the contradictions and ambivalences that constitute the very
structure of human subjectivity and its systems of cultural representation?11

Here, Bhabha is exploding the myth of the 'transparency' of the human
agent and the reasonableness of political action at the heart of the liberal
tradition. In contrast to this stark concept of politics, whose space can only
be Right or Left, theory opens up the ambivalent and phantasmic texts
that make 'the political' possible:
The language of critique is effective ... to the extent to whlch it overcomes the given
grounds of opposition and opens up a space of 'translation'; a place of hybridity,
figuratively speaking, where the construction of a political object that is new, neither
the one nor the Other, properly alienates our political expectations, and changes, as
it must, the very forms of our recognition of the 'moment' of politics.19
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For the radical critic, the advantage of theory lies in its being able to prevent a relationship of simple identity forming between the political objective and its means of representation. In denying an essentialist logic and
a mimetic referent to political representation, it cuts through the moralism
that usually accompanies political separatism. In this sense, its impact can
be described as ideological. This is not to deny the importance of more
overtly material or political forms of anti-colonial struggle: theory cannot
of itself substitute for these. Rather, it is to challenge the belief that theory
is not a radically subversive force.
Though for the most part Parry appeals to a Manichean model of identity, and thereby carefully avoids the slide toward essentialism, there are
nevertheless moments when her argument hinges on the notion of authenticity. One such moment is her appeal to native culture as the platform
from which a recalcitrant identity can be fashioned. This appeal is, I
would suggest, responsible for her misconstruction of Bhabha's project.
Take, for example, her assertion that 'by showing the wide range of
stereotypes and the shifting subject positions assigned to the colonized in
the colonialist text, [Bhabha] sets out to liberate the colonial from its
debased inscription as Europe's monolithic and shackled Other, and into
an autonomous native "difference"' .2!) Or consider her subsequent conclusion that, in Bhabha's work 'the subaltern has spoken, and his readings of
the colonialist text recover a native voice' .21 I would like to know how we
can reconcile this idea of the autonomy of the speaking subject not only
with Bhabha's own theses concerning the ambivalence of colonial discourse and the refraction of the subjectivity of both colonizer and colonized, but also with his claim that the only space of resistance on offer to
the colonized is the mimicry or parody of the speech of the colonizer.22
A further difficulty occurs with respect to her invocation of Said's concept of oppositional criticism. At first glance, this might seem easy to
reconcile with her appeal to Fanon's theory of a unified consciousness for
the colonized, which is collective and stands in unmitigated antagonism
toward the oppressor. But in fact Said's oppositional criticism 'posits
"nothing less than new objects of knowledge ... new theoretical models
that upset or at the very least radically alter the prevailing paradigmatic
norms"'23 precisely because these are based on an unmitigated antagonism
and hatred of the Other?4 In appealing to Said's notion of oppositional
consciousness Parry is therefore ignoring his rejection of the Manichean
discourse adopted by Fanon. As far as Said is concerned, the destructive
forms of representation used by both colonizer and colonized alike must
be replaced by more positive and conciliatory modes which emphasize the
overlapping of cultural boundaries and the interdependence of the historical narratives belonging to either side. This would involve abandoning
fixed ideas of settled identity and culturally authorized definition.25 Said's
own interpolation of Fanon gives prominence to the latter's vision of a
new form of identity which recognizes both racial and class equality as
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well as the idea of the collective.26 This is a reading which emphasizes the
dialectical nature of Fanon's program of counter-insurgency in order to
down-play any importance given to a destructive or antagonistic phase
based on the recovery of native traditions. This is perhaps to be expected
given Said's idea that nativism invariably gives rise to a ardent practice
of separatism.
Both Bhabha's defence of theory and Said's dialectical interpretation of
Fanon should perhaps serve to warn us that the emphasis which Parry
places on nativism in her own reading of Fanon may be attributable to an
unspoken desire to retain the antagonistic paradigms of identity. A careful
reading of Fanon would lend support to this hypothesis, for it reveals that
although the appeal to native culture does help to facilitate the production
of a new self, it never assumes anything like the cardinal role that it does
in Parry's account. Moreover, in my opinion Said is quite right to give
more weight to the conciliatory aspects of Fanon's program than to what
he perceives as its unwonted element of violence, particularly since it is
Fanon's dream of producing a radically new form of humanism- tolerant
of heterogeneity - which distinguished his narrative of nationalism from
the one sustaining European imperialism. But in stressing the placatory
moments of Fanon's program at the expense of its more dissonant phase,
it would seem that it is also Said' s intention to dissuade post-colonial
intellectuals from appealing to an authentic or originary identity. His
ulterior motive would seem to be to keep the space of the Other from
being appropriated by the still powerful arm of western imperialism, this
time round in the form of the dominant narratives of postmodernism. For
according to Said, despite inroads made by earlier anti-colonialist intellectuals such as C.L.R. James and Fanon, the struggle for control of cultural representation continues unabated today, the latest target for appropriation being the 'otherness' or 'difference' of the non-European world.27
In this connection, Said has drawn our attention to the way in which the
relentless celebration of 'otherness' and 'difference' by First World intellectuals has reached the status of 'spectacle', with the unfortunate result
that Western intellectuals have felt they can continue to blatantly ignore
the presence of the Third World. As a case in point, he singles out JeanFran~ois Lyotard, who accounts for the phenomenon of postmodernism
in terms of a loss of the legitimizing power of the great narratives of
emancipation and Enlightenment, and their replacement by smaller local
narratives legitimated by their users' ability to manipulate the codes in
order to get things done. 28 According to Said this is an explanation which
shows Lyotard to be guilty of separating Western postmodernism from the
non-European world, and from the consequences of European modernism
and modernization in the colonized world. For Said, Lyotard's narrative
represents the culminating stage of a process of relentless aestheticization
and sterilization of modernism - a dynamic which can be traced through
Albert Camus's version of Algeria. For in stark contrast to Fanon's Arabs,
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those of lA Peste and L'Etranger are 'nameless beings used as background
for the portentous European metaphysics explored by Camus, who, we
should recall, in his Cronique algerienne denied the existence of an Algerian
nation'.29
In place of the intrinsically one-sided, or ethnocentric accounts proffered
by intellectuals such as Lyotard, Said would like to see narratives which
take the Third World seriously by placing what it has to say on equal
terms with its own explanations. The current dearth of such material within the First World can be attributed to a failure on the part of its presentday intellectuals to attend to the fuller global context in which the West's
ideological productions occur - something which Said believes is being
covered over by the vogue for 'thick descriptions and blurred genres'
which only act to 'shut and block out the clamor of voices on the outside
asking for their claims about empire and domination to be considered' .30
Nor does he consider that the recovery of this fuller, more responsible perspective can be easily achieved. For instance, it isn't a case of exercising
a politically, or ideologically disinterested form of reason based on aestheticism or theory as distinct from ethics or morality; for as history has
shown this kind of reason always works to the advantage of the West.
Rather, about the best that responsible critics can do is to uncover the
political interests concealed behind the rarefied instituUonal practices of
interpretation produced by their own culture:
ln short what is now before us nationally, and in the full imperial panorama, is the
deep, the profoundly perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to
others - other cultures, other states, other histories, other experiences, traditions,
peoples, and destinies. The difficulty with the question is that there is no vantage
outside the actuality of relationships between cultures, between unequal imperial
and non-imperial powers, between different Others, a vantage that might allow one
the epistemological privilege of somehow judging, evaluating, and interpreting free
of the encumbering interests, emotions, and engagements of the ongoing relationships themselves. When we consider the connections between the United States and
the rest of the world, we are so to speak of the connections, not outside and beyond
them. It therefore behooves us as intellectuals, humanists, and secular critics to
grasp the role of the United States in the world of nations and power, from within
the actuality, and as participants in it, not as detached outside observers who, like
Oliver Goldsmith in Yeats' marvellous phrase, deliberately sip at the honeypots of
our minds.31

Spivak, also, is highly critical of the current intellectual enterprise of constituting the colonial subject as Other, and in her article 'Can the Subaltern
Speak?' she cautions post-colonial critics against such an undertaking by
reminding them that wherever such a subjectivity is theorized by First
World intellectuals, it is accompanied by the desire to conserve the Subject
of the West.32 She even ventures to suggest that '[t]he theory of pluralized
"subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty
while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge'. Hence her
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contention that: 'The much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject
thus actually inaugurates a Subject'.33 A good example of this kind of critique is a text entitled 1ntellectuals in Power' by Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze.34 In her analysis of this text, Spivak points to the inherent
contradiction in Foucault's and Deleuze's claim concerning the contributions made by French post-structuralist theory to counter-hegemonic discourse. On the one hand they maintain that the networks of power I
desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent
narrative is counterproductive - which is why a persistent critique is
needed. On the other hand, insisting that intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know Society's Other, they proceed to articulate it in terms
which are at once Eurocentric (by reducing radical struggle to the 'the
worker's struggle') and essentialist (by appealing to the empirical reality
of the worker's 'concrete experience', as is seen in Foucault's claims that
'the masses know perfectly well', and 'they know far better than [the intellectual] and they certainly say it very well'). As Spivak notes, the latter
lends support to a positivistic paradigm which in turn forms the justifying
foundation of an advanced capitalistic neo-colonialism: 'This S/subject,
curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the
exploiters' side of the international division of labour' .35 The source of this
contradiction, so Spivak argues, lies in a failure to distinguish between
two different categories of representation: representation as 'speaking for',
as in politics; and representation as 're-presentation', as in art and philosophy. Thus it is the opposition between 'applied practice' (suggested by
the appeal to 'concrete experience') and 'pure theory' which conflates the
two forms and affords the transparency of the intellectual.
For Spivak, Foucault's effort to locate epistemic violence in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century constitutes a powerful instance of the transparency of the intellectual, precisely
because it fails to rewrite the history of the systematic suppressions and
marginalizations of Western society since the eighteenth century in accordance with the discourses of 'normativity' effected by imperialism. In other
words, in Foucault's account what was represented as normal was deemed
not to be the result of contact with other cultures. What is left out of such
a version is a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to the taste of First World intellectuals because they are thought
to be 'insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledge, located low down on the
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity'.36 Such
an attitude, Spivak contends, is oblivious to the possibility that European
intellectuals can never 'know' the non-European in any way other than
through the prism of their own desires:
It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power
and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not
only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of
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the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject
as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of the Other of Europe, great care was
taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect,
could occupy (invest?) its itinerary- not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law.31

To ask therefore what happens to the critique of the sovereign subject
when it is applied to the knowledge of society's Other leads to the realization that, in representing the subaltern, intellectuals represent themselves
as transparent. This is another way of saying that the western project to
constitute the colonial subject as Other itself constitutes an instance of
epistemic violence.
If Said's and Spivak's views are to be taken seriously, then surely we
must ask ourselves if Parry's desire to rescue the native woman subject
from out of the quiescence imposed on her by recent criticism has more
in common with the sort of epistemic violence which Spivak has just been
describing than with the 'exceptional stance' of Fanon. As Parry herself
has noted, her own objective is in marked contrast to the position taken
up by Spivak, in whose writings the native subject is historically muted
as a result of 'the planned epistemic violence of the imperialist project',
where the native was prevailed upon to internalize as self-knowledge the
knowledge concocted by the master. This required of the native that herewrite his position as object of imperialism by domesticating the alien as
Master and himself as a self-consolidating and silent Other, a process
which brought about the European 'worlding' of the native's own world.
Hence the following premise:
No perspective critical of imperialism can tum the Other into a self, because the
project of imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have
been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that consolidates the imperialist self.... A full literary inscription cannot easily flourish in the imperialist fracture
of discontinuity, covered over by an alien legal system masquerading as Law as
such, an alien ideology established as only truth, and a set of human sciences busy
establishing the 'native' as self-consoHdating Other.38

If this is true of the native in a general sense then it is doubly true for the
native as woman. Spivak's observation that 'One never encounters the
testimony of the women's voice-consciousness', 'There is no space from
where the subaltern (sexed) subject can speak', 'The subaltern as female
cannot be heard or read', and 'The subaltern cannot speak'39 is derived
from studying the discourse of Sati, in which the Hindu patriarchal code
converged with colonialism's narrativization of Indian culture to efface all
traces of woman's voice. This study could conceivably be used as a starting point for a critique of Fanon's reinscription of native culture as
demonstrated by his story of the haik. Just as the tradition of widow sacrifice became a battleground for the competing discourses of Hindu patriarchy and imperialist culture - a terrain from which the voice of the
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subaltern woman was excluded- so it is possible that Algerian women
had little or no say in clashes between the revolutionaries and the French
government over the wearing of the vei1.40 A critique developed along
these lines could prove an embarrassment to Parry's attempt to rescue the
notion of an autonomous speaking voice and unified subjectivity for the
native or subaltern woman based on a revival of elements belonging to the
traditional native culture.
The omission of women from the formation of both traditional and revolutionary forms of culture is not the only aspect of Fanon's work which
could serve to compromise Parry's argument. In ascribing to traditional
native culture the power to generate a new identity for the colonized,
Parry is seriously violating the spirit of Fanon's whole critique of nativism.
For Fanon, native culture had but a transitional part to play in the revolutionary process. Indeed, its only role was in the second phase of liberation
- the moment when the native, discovering that 'the settler's skin is not
of any more value than a native's skin', turns away from the values of the
colonizing culture and comes into touch again with those of his own
people. Here, in contrast to the 'individualism' and 'egoism' of the settler,
the native rediscovers the strength to be gained from communal ideals.
This is the power of unity contained in 'the substance of village
assemblies, the cohesion of people's committees, and the extraordinary
fruitfulness of local meetings and groupments'. Above all, it is this new
found communalism which forms the basis of the political cohesion of the
colonized: 'Henceforward, the interest of one will be the interests of all,
for in concrete fact e:veryone will be discovered by the troops, e:veryone will
be massacred - or e:veryone will be saved. The motto "look out for
yourself', the atheist's method of salvation, is in this context forbidden.' 41
But what is being insinuated here is that bourgeois individualism isn't the
only enemy of liberation; it is also those aspects of traditional native
culture, such as tribalism and chieftainship, which because of their
inherently hierarchical qualities have proved to be compatible with the
colonizer's culture:
The colonial system encourages chieftaindes and keeps alive the old Mara bout confraternities. Violence is in action all-inclusive and national. It follows that it is
closely involved in the liquidation of regionalism and of tribalism. Thus the national
parties show no pity all towards the caids and the customary chiefs. Their destruction is the preliminary to the unification of the people.42

Fanon has to get rid of these features of the native's pre-colonial past because they contravene the notion that one can determine one's own future.
For that, an entirely new belief system is needed, based on the concrete
reality of the present, or the common experience of confronting death at
the hands of the colonizer. Hence his pronouncement that:
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After centuries of unreality, after having wallowed in the most outlandish phantoms, at long last the native, gun in hand, stands face to face with the only forces
which contend for his life- the forces of colonialism And the youth of a colonized
country, growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of,
and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horses
with two heads, the dead who rise again, and the dijnns who rush into your body
while you yawn. The native discovers reality and transforms it into the gattem of
his customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom.

The place of nativism in Fanon's decolonization program, then, is one of
subordination to a revolutionary new culture which in its 'fight against
poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment'44 is unashamedly modem and
progressivist. Here is how Christopher Miller puts it: 'Fanon allows the
look backward into tradition, but only to the extent that it is "in the
intention of opening the future, as an invitation to action and as a basis of
hope" .' 45 Thus Fa non was in fact undermining the force of traditional
native culture by brandishing a completely new type of identity based on
progressivist Marxist principles. Only where traditional native culture
undergoes a radical transformation and takes on new meaning is it conceived of as contributing to the fashioning of such an identity.
Of course it's always possible that Parry's gloss on Fanon's use of native
culture may be deliberate. Miller, for example, has pointed out that one
of the most serious problems with Fanon's theory of a new national culture based on Marxist precepts is that it has provided the inspiration for
the heinous crimes of Guinea's tyrannical leader 5ekou Toure. And he
adds that the problem of Marxism's clash with ethnidty is nowhere more
obvious than in Fanon's dream of imposing a modern form of rationalism
on Africa; for here it can be seen that what is meant to liberate people
from the fetters of colonialism is imperialism in another guise.
Briefly, I would submit that Fa non's use of the word 'nation' covers over important
unresolved tensions between ethnicity and ethics: by placing the word at the center
of his concern for evolution, without questioning the complexities of its application
to different geographical and cultural environments, Fanon winds up imposing his
own idea of nation in places where it may need reappraising. As David Caute has
accurately pointed out, 'It is curious that Fanon, who wanted to snap the bonds of
European culture, should have transformed arbitrary European structures into the
natural units of African progress'. Far from being 'natural national entities' or
cohesive nation-states, the modem nations of black Africa must make do with borders created to satisfy European power brokering in the 'scramble for Africa', borders that violate rather than reinforce units of culture.46

Miller's is both a powerful and persuasive critique of Fa non's progressivist
concept of nationalism, and it raises important moral questions concerning
the destruction of native or ethnic culture when anti-colonialist resistance
acquires a Marxist mien. But even if Parry's interpretation of Fanon is
based on such a concern, there is still reason to be wary of those forms of
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western intellectualism which exhort ethnicity. Spivak, for one, has noted
that: 'In the United States the third-worldism currently afloat in humanistic disciplines is often openly ethnic' .47 And she cautions that a nostalgia
for lost origins can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities
within the critique of imperialism.48 That Spivak places Parry in this category seems clear from her own assessment of the latter's project. Parry's
criticisms, she says, are 'well meaning' but compromised by her insertion
into the nineteenth-century anthropological mode; that is to say she is still
caught within a system of belief which privileges 'the native informant',
as if there is still a pure native voice to be heard.49 Included under the
rubric of third-worldism is the feminist project to constitute the native
subject as Other. That Parry might be party to such a practice is suggested
by her own thesis that: 'What Spivak's strategy of reading necessarily blots
out is Christophine's inscription as the native, female individual Self [my
emphasis] who defies the demands of the discriminatory discourses impinging on her person'.50 For this reference to the individual self places
Parry fairly and squarely within First World feminist discourse, something
which I believe is reinforced by her subsequent declaration that 'it should
be possible to locate traces and testimony of women's voice[s) on those
sites where women inscribed themselves as healers, ascetics, singers of
sacred songs'.51 Such a proposal betrays the influence of a western feminism which attempts to articulate a separate women's identity for western
and non-western women alike through the recovery of a separate female
tradition, while ignoring its own privileged positioning on the other side
of the international division of labour.
Caught between the coercions of a totalizing counter-discourse of
national liberation, and the epistemic violence implicit in the project of
speaking for the colonial subject, what forms of resistance remain open to
the subaltern woman? Having exposed the tacit imperialism behind the
post-structuralist project of knowing and disclosing society's Other, Spivak
admits that the critic is still left with the problem of what constitutes a
more recuperable project than the 'clandestine restoration of subjective
essentialism'. For an answer she looks to traditional Marxist theory and
in particular to the critique of the individual as oppressed subject. Here
the two different categories of representation referred to earlier are not
conflated. Class consciousness consequently remains attached to the feeling of community that belongs to national links and political organizations, and not to that other experience of desire whose structural model
is the family. Thus full class agency (if there were such a thing) is not an
ideological transformation of consciousness on the ground level, a desiring
identity of the agents and their interest, an identity whose absence
troubles Foucault and Deleuze. Hence Spivak's view is that a radical practice should attend to what she describes as Marx's 'double session' of representations rather than introduce the individual subject through totalizing
concepts of power and desire.52 Put more simply, it should insist on the
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distinction between the plurality of subject-effects adduced by art and
philosophy and the conscious subject of politics. She is also of the view
that the critic would do well to follow Marx's example in keeping the area
of class practices on the second level of abstraction (as distinct from the
stage of 'concrete experience'), for by doing this Marx effectively kept
open the I<antian (and Hegelian) critique of the individual subject as agent
of history. And she further notes: 1t does seem to me that Marx's questioning of the individual as agent of history should be read in the context
of the breakin§ up of the individual subject inaugurated by Kant's reading
of Descartes'. All of this represents a solution compatible with the poststructuralist critique of the sovereign Subject.
For Spivak, what remains useful in Foucault is what she calls the mechanics of 'disciplinarization and institutionalization', the constitution, as it
were, of the colonizer. This, she believes, can be used to much greater
analytic and interventionist advantage than his invocations of the authenticity of the Other. In a similar vein to this kind of work is Spivak's own
attempt to develop a strategy of reading that will 'speak to', as distinct
from 'speaking for', the historically muted subaltern woman.
In seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the historically
muted subject of the subaltern woman, the post-colonial intellectual systematically
'unlearns' female privilege. This systematic unlearning involves learning to critique
post-colonial discourse with the best tools it can provide and not simply substituting the lost figure of the colonized.54

Given that Parry's complaints against Spivak include her ignoring of the
methods of liberation of the 1950s, it is ironical that Spivak alone endeavours to return post-colonial criticism to a Marxist notion of consciousness.
Her aim here is mainly to take the emphasis off an individualist concept
of freedom so as to return anti-colonial struggle to its roots in collective
as well as political and economic freedom. The individualist concept of
freedom is something adhered to by both Parry and western 'culture'
critics in general, and would appear to have been developed out of
Fanon's theories on the phenomenological self.55
To summarize, recent debates are divided on the issues of whether or
not the post-colonial intellectual should be engaged in the attempt to recover an autonomous form of subjectivity for the Others of Europe that
will allow them to 'speak for themselves.' Such a view would have it that:
'The current post-structuralist/post-modern challenges to the coherent,
autonomous subject have to be put on hold in feminist and post-colonial
discourses, for both must work first to assert and affirm a denied or
alienated subjectivity.'56 Vying with this argument is the one which
believes that the theorizing of an autonomous subject for the colonized
ministers to the desire of First World intellectuals to know and thereby
control the Other of the West. Faced with this prospect, the most that
post-colonial intellectuals can hope to do is to continue critiquing the
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subject of the West. This is the position taken by Spivak who has argued
that:
If instead we concentrated on documenting and theorizing the itinerary of the con-

solidation of Europe as sovereign subject, indeed sovereign and subject, then we
would produce an alternative historical narrative of the 'worlding' of what is today
called 'the Third World'. To think of the Third World as distant cultures, exploited
but with rich intact heritages waiting to be recovered, interpreted, and curricularized in English translation helps the emergence of the 'Third World' as a signifier
that allows us to forget that 'worlding,' even as it expands the empire of the
discipline.57

The ground covered by this article represents what remains today of the
challenge to both colonial and neo-colonial forms of representation proffered by Fanon. The shifts which have taken place in the interim period
would have to include the attempt on behalf of Western intellectuals to
restore themselves to a position of global supremacy through the deployment of increasingly subtle methods of cultural appropriation, as weU as
the efforts of post-colonial intellectuals to respond in equally wily fashion.
What the outcome of these changes will be is very hard to predict; the
ground I have just covered, for instance, serves only to confirm that the
space of representation opened up by Fanon is still being hotly contested.
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